The Price of Keeping the Strait of Hormuz Open

In June, Washington and Tehran signed the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, a fourteen-point framework built around a sixty-day ceasefire meant to keep the Strait of Hormuz open while deeper talks proceeded on Iran's nuclear programme and its regional militias. Within days, Iranian forces began striking civilian tankers passing through the strait, and the ceasefire has since fractured into a string of shorter truces, each shakier than the last — a pattern still playing out on 09.08.2026, when the United Arab Emirates accused Iran of missiling one of its own tankers. Writing in Palladium, Marko Jukic argues that Washington keeps mistaking the underlying bargain: Iran is not going to accept indefinite restraint on the strait, or on its other pressure points, without receiving something concrete in return. His prescription is blunt — sanctions relief on oil exports, release of billions in frozen Iranian assets, and a channel for reconstruction financing, offered in exchange for measurable steps back from the strait, not vague promises. The alternative, he warns, is a rolling cycle of ceasefires that each buy a few weeks of calm before collapsing, while shipping insurers and energy markets price in permanent risk. Jukic's shorthand for the dynamic — economic relief for bombing restraint — looks likely to define the negotiation as it grinds into its second year.